Lebanon on the Precipice: Christians as Essential Peacemakers

By Fernando José Vaquero Oroquieta.

First Iraq faced collapse, then Syria descended into chaos—could Lebanon be next? What distinguishes Lebanon from its neighbors is the continued presence of a robust, visible Christian minority that retains political influence and decision-making capacity. This unique characteristic positions Lebanon as the region's foremost hope for stability.

Much has shifted since Pope Benedict XVI's memorable visit to Lebanon from September 14-16, 2024. One significant consequence of Syria's devastating civil war, which has raged for over two years, is the intensification of Lebanon's long-standing internal conflicts, pushing the nation toward potential catastrophe.

Primarily, we've witnessed the rise of Salafism as an emerging social and political force in Lebanon, possessing extraordinary power to destabilize the nation. The most extreme Salafist elements, aligned with Al Qaeda, initially took root within Palestinian refugee camps in Tripoli. The Palestinian faction Fatah Al-Islam engaged in exceptionally violent armed confrontations with the Lebanese Army in 2007, a multi-month conflict that claimed hundreds of lives. More recently, in early May this year, new Salafist Palestinian groups—splinter factions from the original—clashed with Al Fatah supporters in southern camps, while Hamas, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood party controlling Gaza, quietly expanded its influence.

Competing with these Salafists is Jamaa Islamiya, the Lebanese political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, established decades ago. During the 1975 civil war, they fielded their own militias in Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon. Their secretary general, Faysal Mawlawi, leads a party holding one parliamentary seat within the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition. They're seeking to expand their representation in upcoming legislative elections amid a reconfiguration of Sunni political forces. Pressured by radical Salafists on one flank and the Hariri clan's Future Movement on another, the group appears to be revitalizing. Within this emerging radical Salafism, Sheikh Ahmed el-Assir's movement stands out—he has confronted Hezbollah both rhetorically and in the streets, particularly around Sidon, traveling throughout Lebanon to incite Sunnis to join Syrian rebel forces and challenge dominant Shiite Hezbollah and its allies. He has announced the formation of his own militia, the Free Resistance Brigades.

Additionally, numerous Lebanese radicals have joined Syrian Salafist militias, particularly the notoriously brutal al-Nusra Front. Many have perished in combat, including sons of two prominent Tripoli Sunni leaders.

Within this context, Lebanese Sunnism remains highly fragmented, though united in opposition to Syria's Baathist regime and its Lebanese Shiite allies in Hezbollah, hoping to translate street gains and involvement in the Syrian conflict into electoral success.

Secondly, we've seen escalating tensions between Shiites and their Alawite cousins against their perennial Sunni adversaries across all factions. This manifests particularly in armed confrontations within major Tripoli neighborhoods: Jabal Mohsen, controlled by Rifaat Eid's pro-Assad Alawite Arab Democratic Party, and Sunni radical-controlled areas, primarily Bab al Tabbaneh. Beyond claiming over forty lives in recent weeks, this violence has forced partial withdrawal of the Lebanese army from the area, which has suffered various attacks and roughly a dozen fatalities. Confrontations have also erupted in towns near Tripoli: Arsal, Hermel (a northern Shiite city bombed by Syrian rebels), among others. Furthermore, the porous Syrian-Lebanese border facilitates cross-border incursions of varying severity, under the pretext of pursuing enemies and attempting to interdict weapons and fuel smuggling, especially in the north and Bekaa Valley.

Tensions reached such heights that Hezbollah's headquarters in the Shiyah neighborhood of southern Beirut was struck by Russian-made rockets. This animosity extends to the highest symbolic levels. Consider Saleh Sabbagh, a Hezbollah militant killed fighting in Syria, born to a Sunni father and Shiite mother, who had to be buried on May 22 in a Shiite cemetery in Sidon after Sunni clerics refused burial in his father's cemetery.

Thirdly, attempts to modify electoral law have emerged. Facing demographic changes—growth in the Shiite population and decline in Christian voters—efforts have been made to replace the still-valid 1960 electoral law with a so-called "Orthodox project" that would guarantee Christians a new stable percentage. Under this system, each voter would only vote for candidates of their own confession. Maintaining stable Christian representation would provide a moderating factor and alternative alliance possibilities to the seemingly inevitable final confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis.

Fourth, we're witnessing progressive paralysis of both the Lebanese state and army. A new prime minister, Tamam Salam, was appointed on April 6, 2025, replacing the resigned Najib Mikati. The alternative to the previous Hezbollah-controlled government was a national unity government or technocratic cabinet. However, little progress has been made forming this transitional government, whose primary objectives would be maintaining peace and holding elections on June 16. This agenda appears increasingly difficult as the overall situation deteriorates daily, particularly due to consequences on Lebanese soil from the Syrian conflict's evolution.

Fifth, and perhaps most dangerous, is Hezbollah's full involvement in the Syrian conflict. Initially, senior military advisors participated as consultants, with some killed in Israeli drone strikes and rebel incursions. Subsequently, in February, they unreservedly supported the Popular Committees formed in approximately forty Shiite villages—populated mostly by some 30,000 Shiites holding dual Syrian-Lebanese nationality—along the Lebanese border, defending against Syrian Salafist insurgent attacks. Finally, several thousand Hezbollah fighters have led governmental forces' strategic counterattack in Qusair, attempting to reverse the war's course or at least strengthen the regime for hypothetical peace negotiations. Dozens of Hezbollah martyrs have been buried on Lebanese soil with mass ceremonies for this reason.

Lastly, there's Israel's role in the regional context—always a keen observer of Hezbollah's position as head of Lebanese "resistance." Fear that Hezbollah might control Syria's Golan Heights, from which to attack Israel, combines with suspicion of militia/party rearmament through new weapons with greater range and logistical capacity from Syrian arsenals. Consequently, Israel has intervened directly on several occasions. It has maintained aerial confrontations with unmanned drones from southern Lebanon. It has bombed Hezbollah targets in Lebanese territory. And it has conducted other high-impact "covert operations." On January 30, Iranian Brigadier General Hassan Shateri, alias Hessam Khoshnevis, died in combat. Initially announced as resulting from clashes with Syrian rebels, it apparently occurred in an Israeli air strike against the Syrian military complex at Jamraya (north of Damascus) and a weapons convoy destined for Hezbollah. Shateri would have been one of the top officials of the elite Al-Quds Force, responsible for covert operations outside Iran, overseeing collaboration with the Syrian regime and supervising Hezbollah's rearmament.

In this explosive context, Christians' role could prove decisive.

A preliminary consideration: comprising approximately forty percent of the population, they're divided among numerous confessions (Maronite Catholics, Latins, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenians, Protestants, Chaldeans, Assyrians). They're likewise distributed among various majority-Christian political parties: Kataeb (Lebanese Phalanges), Lebanese Forces, National Liberal Party (all three aligned in the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition); Free Patriotic Movement, Marada, Syrian Social Nationalist Party (allied in the pro-Syrian March 8 coalition, currently governing); plus a handful of independent Christian parliamentarians and small "centrist" extra-parliamentary parties. Despite their diverse positions, they maintain dialogue among themselves, thanks to excellent work by Christian church leaders, particularly Maronite Cardinal Béchara Boutros Raï. They possess no armed militias and have not engaged in any armed conflict since their defeat in the civil war. But Raï's authority transcends his own community—he's consulted by leaders from all Lebanese factions, including the Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah. On May 18 in Bogotá, concluding his pastoral visit to Maronite diaspora communities throughout Latin America, he declared that "The war in Syria has divided Lebanese into two factions, one siding with the opposition and the other with Assad's government. But I tell you loudly that this is not our business—we must not interfere in any country's internal affairs. I say to Lebanese politicians and officials: think about building your deteriorated country, rather than taking part in Syria's war. Stop playing with our country's destiny, which has given so much to the world." With remarkable insight, he also noted that the current political stalemate, resulting primarily from blocked electoral reform and difficulty forming a new government, confirms that Lebanon's political class "is unworthy and incapable of assuming the country's leadership."

Moderate Muslims of all factions—and even some not so moderate—who don't want to see their country again plunged into sectarian "all against all" war and who understand that the Lebanese state must prevail, have declared privately and publicly that only the Christian presence can allow democracy to survive and safeguard peace. Without their "hinge" and moderating role, Sunnis and Shiites would face each other, as elsewhere in the Middle East, in total war with the ultimate goal of religious ethnic cleansing, as happened in Iraq and is currently happening in Syria.

During this author's journey through Lebanon last June, a Maronite of Venezuelan origin mentioned repeatedly that his Muslim friends begged him not to emigrate—because without Christians, Lebanon would be headed for war. And an elderly Armenian from Anjar, barely three kilometers from the Syrian border, reflected that Armenians and Turks can speak together; Christians and Muslims can as well. But the age-old hatred between Sunnis and Shiites would never find remedy.

Therefore, the Holy See's constant appeals—almost solitary—for dialogue, cessation of hostilities, and respect for religious and national minorities in Syria and throughout the region represent the only possibility for effective peace, provided Christians survive in those lands where their faith took root before it reached Europe and the New World.