General Blas Piñar Gutiérrez of the Spanish Army serves as chairman of the Santa María del Alcázar Brotherhood. In this role, he sits down with journalist Gustavo Morales, former national leader of the Falange movement. The General greets this correspondent warmly. His responses come quickly and confidently, with some of his statements proving particularly striking.
Question: Sagunto, Numancia, Baler, Santa María de la Cabeza, El Alcázar: Is Spanish heroism also characterized by static defense?
Blas Piñar Gutiérrez: Spanish heroism has existed throughout our history. This is demonstrated by the very pages of our past. The events at the Alcázar in Toledo connect with a series of actions that took place not only on the Iberian Peninsula but also across Europe, the Americas, and even in Asia with the Philippines. Beyond the most famous examples, we could multiply these heroic defensive stands with lesser-known but equally significant stories. We must consider this something inherent to the Spanish character.
Question: There was a plan for the uprising, hence the concentration of civil guards in Toledo, but there wasn't a prior plan to entrench themselves in the Alcázar. The fall of Toledo pushed them into it. At their head stood Colonel Moscardó, director of the School of Physical Education. Spanish improvisation?
B.P.G: I'm convinced that both Moscardó and the rest of the garrison weren't aware of the National Uprising plans. Their reaction was somewhat instinctive, driven from within. In reality, Toledo had no combat units or operational forces. There were training centers: the Academy, the School of Physical Education, the Orphans' College, and then various administrative elements. So it's logical to think they weren't part of the Uprising's framework. In fact, no priest was enclosed inside, which evidences the improvisation.
Question: What significance did the Alcázar feat hold, then?
B.P.G: It becomes increasingly clear each day that the liberation of the Alcázar had an enormously important influence on the war's development. We can speak of a before and after. Keep in mind that the rebel-held territories were in the minority, not only in quantity but in terms of resource capacity for the kind of confrontation that unfolded in Spain. The liberation of Toledo marked a significant turning point. Moreover, it had tremendous moral impact. It was the first major victory for the National Army, with international repercussions, and the first major defeat for the Popular Front Army, which proved incapable of holding a small capital city just 70 kilometers from Madrid.
Question: The quality of the officers, the sacrifice of civilians, commitment to duty over comfort: Have Spaniards of that stature disappeared today?
B.P.G: The stature of people is proven in difficult moments. Spain's situation at this moment is far from easy. It's also true that we've reached this situation slowly, progressively, step by step. This makes it harder for the stature of Spanish men and women to react. Great enemies provoke great reactions, but in this moment, with this gradual, deliberate, perhaps programmed advance against what Spain represents, there hasn't been that violent confrontation to provoke rebellion. There is, at least, the beginning of a movement in the consciences of Spaniards that could emerge at any moment. It happens to all of us, that we reflect on History and see the mark left by great Spaniards. But let's not doubt that, to reach those moments, they had to overcome difficulties or situations very similar to what we currently face. I'm optimistic. The moment of glory comes after a long period of doubt, difficulties, betrayals, false loyalties. What transcends historically is the result of action. The future is in our hands.
Question: The conversation between Colonel Moscardó and his son.
B.P.G: It was Moscardó's decision, without influences or pressure. His subordinates were present in the office. Nobody expected the Militia chief to call threatening to execute Moscardó's son. The person holding the phone responded clearly that they should save themselves the minutes they'd given him to think it over.
Question: The National Army advancing from the south diverted to liberate Toledo: a symbol or a moral obligation?
B.P.G: The diversion was relative, only in the final kilometers. When Franco began the march from Seville toward Madrid, the shortest path wasn't the one he took. From a military standpoint, the fastest routes aren't the shortest. The National Army went to Badajoz. Franco chose the Extremadura route to surprise the enemy. He had strong support on his left flank with Portugal, a secure flank. There was also urgency to unite with Northern forces under Mola's command, which were in very precarious condition, especially lacking ammunition. The theoretically longer path was actually the feasible one. It was a wise decision. When he reached Talavera de la Reina, he faced the dilemma of heading directly to Madrid or first detouring to Toledo. Franco concluded that with the forces he had and those present in the capital, taking Madrid was impossible at that moment. The resistance he was encountering was increasing. The Popular Front Army was better organized each day and had better human and material resources. Liberating Toledo was a moral blow, the fulfillment of a promise.
Question: Are there still little-known episodes surrounding the Alcázar? For example, on September 26, a Ju52 was shot down by red fighters who machine-gunned the crew parachuting down, among them the brothers of Julio Ruiz de Alda and Ramiro Ledesma, who were killed.
B.P.G: The definitive text on the defense and liberation of the Alcázar of Toledo is still missing. There are writings immediately following the liberation, like those by Father Risco or Martínez Leal. Others, mainly military authors like Martínez Bande, truly delved into the archives; other authors base their work on his. We must highlight the contributions of Casas de la Vega and also Palomino. But both Martínez Bande and Casas de la Vega conducted studies exclusively from the military perspective. In a war like ours, and in an episode like the Alcázar, there are things that transcend the purely military that could also be researched much more deeply. The work we could call definitive is missing, an in-depth study not only of events and facts but also of the people. Both the defenders and each individual defender, not just the most famous, as well as the attackers who played their important role as the other side of the siege. The figures of the column commanders sent from Madrid or the militia chiefs themselves need deeper study to know their exact role and trajectory. To highlight the deeds, you must know who your opponent is. Sometimes, by denigrating the attackers, you diminish the importance of the defense. The attacking column had enormous defects, there was no unity of command, everyone was in charge: the military chief, the militia chief, the civil governor—too many giving orders and too few obeying them. There was much indiscipline, but that doesn't mean the contingent didn't somehow rectify things over the seventy days of siege. Although there were many weekend militiamen just there for the photo, there were people who died in successive assaults. When people risk their lives and surrender them for something, that's worthy of respect. We're not like those on the other side. I admire the last defenders of the Popular Front in Toledo, locked in various buildings. In their own way, they too were heroic. Their cause was mistaken, but regarding personal valor—not generally but in some cases—we must acknowledge they fought well. Like many of them, in the end, they were dissidents from the official Communist line of the Popular Front, so they didn't stand out. Tagüeña was a character, and I haven't seen him receive any recognition. I can add Colonel Casado and also Cipriano Mera, an admirable man not only for his trajectory in the war as a soldier but especially for his later life in France, where he lived and died working his trade as a bricklayer. We must acknowledge that in the other camp there were people who fought, with complete nobility, for a better Spain. That we don't share their idea of that Spain doesn't mean we don't admire the generosity of their conduct. I wish in today's Spain there were also people of that caliber in the other camp.
Question: Being heroes of the Alcázar wasn't enough for some who marched as volunteers to the Blue Division.
B.P.G: Surviving the Alcázar siege bordered on miraculous. Conditions were negative and prospects very bleak for emerging alive from that situation. They succeeded through their valor in defense and the aggressiveness of the columns coming from Seville. Humanly, it would have been easy to exploit personal success without seeking more positions of risk. But that didn't happen. The totality of Alcázar combatants who were able enlisted in National Army units. Not only active military personnel, which was logical for them to continue in the ranks, but also retirees who entered the Alcázar and, above all, civilians. We highlight the Falangists for being the largest group. Throughout the conflict, many who had emerged alive from the Alcázar fell in combat. A month or two later, Captain Vela Hidalgo fell during operations in Casa de Campo—quite a character who had proclaimed the State of War in Toledo, served as liaison with the Falangists, and led most of the sorties outside the siege. There are numerous examples. When the war ended in 1939, as a culmination, they enlisted in the Blue Division in 1941. After the Spanish conflict, after everything they and their families had endured, they signed up for a genuine adventure, a challenge, an example of dedication to serving the homeland like the Blue Division was. Some perished there, others disappeared, and others managed to return to Spain for the final challenge: working and moving Spain forward. The service work doesn't end in combat but continues in years of peacetime work to achieve the Spain that this so-called democracy inherited and doesn't know how much it received at the cost of an enormously generous generation's effort.
Question: What does that feat mean today, three-quarters of a century later?
B.P.G: What the Alcázar was, from the 1960s onward in the reconstruction, could continue being admired not only by Spaniards but also by foreigners who visited it. This somehow kept the memory alive among Spaniards. The Ministry of Defense, with the transfer of the Army Museum to Toledo, removed all traces of the Alcázar's defense from its current headquarters. They removed plaques from other countries, from authorities who recognized what the Alcázar sacrifice and heroism meant. Everything disappeared. They even lowered the floor of the basements by over a meter so no trace would remain of what the defense was. To top it off, the crypt, where defenders who wished it are buried, currently remains closed. It's incongruous that a feat recognized universally keeps the crypt closed so visitors can't see it, as if those who administer the Museum were ashamed that this could be known by new generations. They're trying to erase what the Alcázar of Toledo was because they consider it a symbol and an important one. It aligns with the three objectives the adversary has set: the Blue Division, the Valley of the Fallen, and the Alcázar of Toledo. They're three known, clear, clean, universal examples that they need to combat by erasing any memory, having failed to distort their meaning in the name of a historical memory that means the destruction of historical traces.
Question: Does official historical memory intend to win with ink in the Official Gazette what they were incapable of achieving through deeds? Is resentment a hallmark of the left's identity?
B.P.G: It's clearly resentment, there's no other explanation. Armies are great not only for their victories but also for their defeats. The same applies to ideas and values. A left—to call it something because I don't know if it deserves that name—that had known how to acknowledge defeat in war and in Spain's peace would have set to work for Spain's good. Because the theoretical objectives of that left, especially in the social aspect, were fulfilled much more deeply by Franco's regime. They wouldn't now be attempting the most miserable thing that can be done, which isn't destroying Franco's works because they're not bad and they don't tear them down. What they eliminate are the plaques, the names, the memories, but they maintain the works. If Franco's regime had been so nefarious, they'd put plaques saying those bad things were Franco's work; they wouldn't remove the plaque so people don't know who did it. It's the product of resentment and incapacity.
Question: What are the objectives of the Brotherhood you preside over today?
B.P.G: The Brotherhood was born during the siege itself. One of its virtues is the spirit with which they lived through the siege. One manifestation is that on August 8th, the newspaper El Alcázar published the statutes of the first Brotherhood of the Alcázar of Toledo. They were conscious of the transcendental bonds they were forming there in defense of certain values. They wanted that to survive after the siege. With that purpose, this Brotherhood was created under ecclesiastical organization: it's registered with the Archdiocese of Toledo because the Catholic faith is the foundation of the patriotic values it defends. In the early years, the Brotherhood consisted of combatants and families who were inside. Over time, to give it continuity, access was also granted to their direct descendants. Seventy-five years later, we've updated the Brotherhood. Besides full members, those who maintain the same values with the same spirit can associate. What was a memory of a heroic deed uniting participants and family members must have a more active tone to fill the gap left by those who had to protect the Alcázar feat of Toledo and its impact. Let's not forget the Alcázar was a military deed where three individual Laureate Crosses were earned, one Collective, several individual Military Medals, etc. Since this heroic act of arms is something they want to suppress as an example, the Brotherhood assumes a new obligation: filling that void left by official authorities. That's why we carry out a series of informative conferences in different capitals and towns of Spain. We also publish books, like one by Domenico Caporilli, the scriptwriter of "No News from the Alcázar," called The Siege of the Alcázar, and a novel by Hispanic-Venezuelan Lídice Pepper, Time of Love and Hate. Next Wednesday (September 28th) we'll have the presentation of a photography book on the defense and liberation of the Alcázar, published by La Esfera de los Libros. All will be presented in the auditorium of the Padilla Civic Center, on Toledo's Santo Domingo "El Antiguo" Street No. 4.
Additionally, and as an important objective, we have the idea of opening an exhibition hall and museum at the Brotherhood's headquarters in Toledo, on Alférez Provisional Street.
General Blas Piñar Gutiérrez - Professional Background
Married with three children and two grandchildren.
Born April 25, 1948, in Madrid, where he completed primary and secondary studies, beginning Law studies in 1965.
Entered the General Military Academy in 1968 (27th class), receiving the rank of Infantry Lieutenant in 1972.
His early assignments included Recruit Training Center No. 1 (Colmenar Viejo), the Saboya No. 6 Motorized Infantry Regiment (Leganés), and Special Operations Company No. 41 (Barcelona).
Obtained his Law degree from Complutense University of Madrid in 1974.
As Captain, he served in the Cataluña IV Mountain Hunters Battalion (Berga, Barcelona), in Military Instruction of the Complementary Scale, at CIR No. 8 (Alicante), and at Motor Pool No. 1 (Villaverde).
As Major and Lieutenant Colonel, he was stationed at the Army Logistics School and at the Staff Headquarters of Brunete No. 1 Armored Division.
As Colonel, he served at CESEDEN (Higher Center for National Defense Studies) and commanded the Asturias No. 31 Mechanized Infantry Regiment.
As General, he was Deputy Director of Army Doctrine (Granada).
Military Courses:
- Special Operations (Guerrilla)
- Parachutist
- Combat Diver
- Assault Diver
- Tactical Intelligence
- Strategic Intelligence
- General Staff
Foreign Assignments:
- ONUCA Mission in Central America, 1990
- War School in the Argentine Republic, 1993
- Military Attaché in Buenos Aires, Asunción, and Montevideo, 1995-1998
- Command of Spanish Tactical Group XVIII in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO SFOR Mission, 2002
- Head of Spanish Delegation at U.S. Central Command, USCENTCOM, Tampa, Florida, 2005
He is President of the Santa María del Alcázar Brotherhood of Toledo.
Note: General Blas Piñar Gutiérrez will give a conference at the national headquarters of La Falange (Silva Street No. 2, 4th floor, 3) on Friday, May 31st, at 8:00 PM.